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"The doctrine that payment by the debtor of a less sum than the
whole amount of the debt will not extinguish the debt, although the
creditor expressly agree to receive it in full and give a receipt or
writing to that effect, is well established by abundant authority. But
while the correctness of the rule stated may be conceded, it should be
borne in mind that it rests mainly upon a want of consideration for the
promise made."'
The above quotation gives expression to a rule which prevails in most
English and American jurisdictions. 2  It also indicates the reason for
the rule. An obligor by paying all or part of a due, liquidated, and
undisputed obligation suffers no detriment he is not bound to suffer;
he surrenders no legal right he is not bound to surrender. In other
words, there is no consideration for the act of the obligee. A creditor
"might take a horse, or a canary, or a tomtit if he chose, and that was
accord and satisfaction [since the obligor was under no pre-existing
duty to deliver the horse, canary, or tomtit] ; but by a most extraordi-
nary peculiarity of the English Common Law, he could not take 19s.
6d. in the pound ; that was nudum pactum."
This doctrine is not only patently absurd but is inconvenient in
commercial dealings, and, accordingly, distasteful to the courts.' The
thesis now ventured is that the result is not even technically correct, but
is an error resulting from the application of rules regarding considera-
tion to a situation where the whole question of consideration is beside
the point. Professor Ames traced the history of this rule and clearly
pointed out that it originated in a perversion of some decisions dealing
with accord and satisfaction, rendered prior to the time when the doc-
'Ludington v. Bell (1879) 77 N. Y. 138, 43.
II L. R. A. (N. s.) ioi8, note, citing numerous cases.
8Couldery v. Bartrun (iS8o, C. A.) L. R. ig Ch. Div. 394, 399.
'"What principally weighs with me . . . is my conviction that all men of
business, whether merchants or tradesmen, do every day recognize and act on the
ground that prompt payment of a part of their demand may be more beneficial
to them than it would be to insist on their rights and enforce payment of the
whole. Even where the debtor is perfectly solvent, and sure to pay at last, this
is often so. Where the credit of the debtor is doubtful it must be more so."
Foakes v. Beer (1884, H. L.) 9 A. C. 6o5, 622, per Lord Blackburn.
"This rule, being highly technical in its character, seemingly unjust, and often
oppressive in its operation, has been gradually falling into disfavor." Seymour
V. Goodrich (1885) 8o Va. 303, 304.
"The rule is evidently distasteful to the courts, and they have always been
anxious to escape it by nice distinctions." Smith v. Ballon (1851) 1 R. I. 496, 498.
"The history of judicial decisions upon the subject has shown a constant
effort to escape from its absurdity and injustice." Harper v. Graham (85) 20
Ohio, 105, 115.
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trine of consideration obtained a place in English law.' He did this
incidentally to an endeavor on his part to arrive at a correct definition
of consideration. It was his opinion that any act or forbearance should
suffice as consideration, even though that act or forbearance was
already due from the promisee by reason of a pre-existing legal obliga-
tion. While Professor Ames deplored the rule, he expressed no doubt
that consideration is essential to a discharge. On the contrary he
asserted that the decision in such cases as Foakes v. Beer "must vary
accordingly as one or the other of the two theories of detriment (con-
sideration) is adopted."
6  His criticism of the rule above stated was
that it involves a too narrow definition of consideration.
The present writer, of course, could not add anything to the account
of the origin of the rule as found in Professor Ames' article, and it is
with some feeling of presumption that he differs from that ripe scholar
in admitting that there is no consideration for the discharge in such
cases as Foakes v. Beer and asserting that according to legal analogies
no consideration should be essential to the discharge.
7
It is elementary that consideration is necessary in the creation of a
contract, and the act of the obligee in surrendering the obligation is
generally assumed to be the making of a contract., The fallacy lies
in this assumption. While the creditor's discharge of a claim is made
or attempted by a consensual act, the parties do not create or attempt
to create a contractual obligation. The creditor does not "promise to
do or not to do." No resultant right in personam with its correlative
duty is claimed. The transaction, if allowed -to take effect, is fully
executed and the claim extinguished.
It is not contended that the obligation comes to an end by an act of
the obligor who pays only a part of the amount due. He has not fully
performed. Lord Coke was no doubt right in saying that "it is appar-
ent that a lesser sum cannot be a satisfaction of a greater sum." If
the obligation, under the circumstances stated at the outset, comes to an
end, it is by virtue of the manifested consent of the creditor.
The transfer of a property right gives rise to no contract. There
is, of course, a superficial difference between a release by the creditor
'Ames, Two Theories of Consideration (1899) 12 HARv. L. REv. 515, 521,
Lectures on Legal History (913) 329.
'Ames, op. cit., 12 HAzv. L. REv. 517, Lectures on Legal History 325.
' Sir Frederick Pollock also asserts that "the discharge of a contract by the
parol agreement of the parties would seem on principle to require the same
elements of mutual consent and consideration that are necessary for the forma-
tion of simple contracts." Williston's Wald's Pollock, Contracts (i9o6) 815.
' "The reasons upon which these cases were determined were . . . that, when
the debt was due, payment of a part by the debtor was no consideration .for a
promise of the creditor to discharge the residue, as the creditor received nothing
to which he was not entitled, and there being no consideration for any such
agreement it was a nude pact and void." Gray v. Barton (1873) 55 N. Y. 68, 71.
'Co. Lit. 212b.
[Supplement to the Yale Law Journal, November, 192i.]
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and the ordinary transfer of property rights. That this difference 
is
not essential in the present discussion appears when we note the 
true
analysis of the so-called transfer of rights. Such a transfer 
consists
of two parts: first, the transferor is divested of his right 
or rights,
and, second, the transferee is invested with a similar right 
or rights.10
The first element is the same in case of a release by the creditor. 
He
voluntarily divests himself of the right. The second element-viz., 
the
investiture of the transferee (obligor)-seems to be lacking, 
and the
parties perhaps desire that it should be so. The result could 
be no
different, however, if they intended and desired to invest the obligor
with a new right just like the one the obligee gave up: While there
is no rule of law to prevent the investiture of an obligor with a new
right similar to that which the creditor had, there is a rule of necessity
which makes it impossible for such a right to endure in the obligor as a
legal relation. The right which the creditor had, was a capacity to
control the obligor's conduct.
13 If we conceive of the obligor becoming
invested with just the same kind of right, it is a capacity to control his
own conduct and the right-duty ceases to be 
a legal relationship.'
2
The fact that this new right cannot endure and is not desired to endure
in the obligor presents no reason why the creditor should be hindered,
in surrendering his claim to the obligor, by rules of law which do not
hinder in case of ordinary transfer. The creditor's act by way of
releasing a claim is of the same kind as the ordinary act of transfer.
In either case the act is simply the manifested consent of the owner of
the right. In either case the effect of the act on the owner is intended
to be the same, i. e., to divest him of his right or rights. In neither case
does the owner assume a contractual obligation. The sole difference-
and this should not impede the releasing creditor-is that he attempts
less than the ordinary transferor in that he does not pretend to invest
the debtor with a right such as he has held. All difference between
the releasing creditors and other transferors of rights in personam
might be eliminated by regarding the discharge as a transfer to the
debtor. There is no reason why the creditor should not transfer his
right to the debtor. There is of course a reason why the debtor cannot
hold it. It would instantly cancel itself with the correlative duty, and
that would be exactly the result desired. The voluntary release of a
right is thus closely analogous to, if not identical with, the voluntary
10 Cook, Alienability of Choses in Action (1916) 29 HARv. L. REv. 817.
Pound, Legal Rights (1915) 26 INT. Joua. ETH. 92, 94.
""A debtor may pay his debt, but he cannot purchase it, so as to preserve
it as a living chose in action against himself. He cannot be both the creditor of
himself and a debtor to himself. For a man to stand in such a relation to
himself, in individual right and duty, it would be necessary that the law should,
for such a purpose, make two men out of one,-to transform a single indivisible
unit into two separate, independent, and complete beings. Such a transformation
is just as impossible in law as it is in physics." Edison Electric Il1mn. Co. v.
DeMott (1893, Ch.) 51 N. J. Eq. 16, 25 At. 952, per Van Fleet, V. C.
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transfer of the right, and the doctrines relating to transfer would
seem applicable. It may be pei-tinent, therefore, to recall a few of the
doctrines relating generally to the transfer of rights.
The barter of property does not give rise to a contractual obligation.'3
The operative acts by whicl a barter is accomplished resemble those by
which a contract is formed in that they indicate the mutual assent of
the parties; and those consensual acts operate in one case as in the
other to accomplish a change in the legal relations of the parties. A
barter further resembles a contract in that each party receives quid
pro quo. Each divests himself of rights with reference to the object
of barter and invests the other with similar rights. A barter, however,
does not create any right in personam.
While the reciprocal transfers of a barter result in each party
receiving quid pro quo, a person may make just as effectual a transfer
without receiving any reciprocal transfer or other quid pro quo. Such
a one-sided transfer we call a gift instead of a barter; but, when fully
executed, it is just as effectual as a transfer by barter. The gift, like
a barter, is not a cgfitract except in a loose sense. It does not give rise
to any right in personam. When the obligee transfers his claim to the
obligor for a quid pro quo we have the elements of a barter. When he
makes the transfer without a quid pro quo his transfer should, on
principle, be just as effective, the dbsencd of a quid pro quo merely
indicating that the name of the transaction is "gift."
That choses in action are species of property which may be trans-
ferred; that they may pass by way of barter or gift; and that they may
be transferred or surrendered from the obligee to the obligor, are
propositions that should require no argument. But these matters will
be discussed briefly to point otut that such objections as have been
urged at times to the transfer of choses in action do not apply when
the transfer or surrender is from the obligee to the obligor.
The alienability of a chose in action is no longer doubtful. The
only mooted point in that connection is whether the assignee acquires
equitable or absolute ownership.14 It should be observed here that
the only sound objection ever interposed to the transfer of a chose in
"Professor Corbin has clearly indicated that a barter or gift can be referred
to as a contract only in the sense that it is a series of operative acts of the parties
expressing their assent and resulting in new legal relations. The ordinary
barter" or gift does not give rise to a contract in the sense of "relations resulting
from operative acts consisting of a right or rights in personain and the corre-
sponding duties, accompanied by certain powers, privileges, and immunities." As
indicated in the excellent article referred to, if A barters apples to B for money,
or if A gives a chattel to B, the transaction works a change in legal relations but
gives rise to no special right in personam. Corbin, Offer and Acceptance (1917)
26 YALE LAW JouRNAL, 16g.
"4 Cook, op. cit., 29 HARv. L. Rv. 816; Williston, Is the Right of the Assignee
of a Chose in Action Legal or Equitable? (1916) 3o HARv. L. Rxv. 97; Cook,
Alienability of Choses in Action (1917) 3o HARv. L. Ray. 449.
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action grew out of regard for the obligor.'
5 It was not deemed
permissible to subject him to an obligation running to a person with
whom he had made no contract. In case the obligor is the proposed
transferee, privy and consenting to the transaction, this consideration
can have no bearing.
It has been a mooted question whether a chose in action may be the
subject of a gift.-6 The question has usually arisen where the proposed
donee was not the obligor. While there is some contrariety of opinion
among writers and among courts, the validity of such gifts has fre-
quently been recognized.17  So far as there is authority for upholding
such gifts, it affords strong argument for the proposition that a
creditor may gratuitously discharge his debtor, since, on principle, the
debtor should be as eligible as any other donee. The authority against
the validity of such gifts may be examined with the inquiry in mind
as to how far the objections to such transactions apply when the pro-
posed donee is the obligor.
The chief argument against recognizing the transfer of a chose by
way of gift has proceeded from a real or supposed inability of the
would-be donor to pass title in the chose. This difficulty, it will be
remembered, grew out of a deference for the obligor.' Whatever
the true rule should be when the obligor is not party to the transaction,
that argument against the obligee's ability to pass title is foreclosed in
a case where the obligor is privy and consenting. The most prevalent
analysis of assignments is one which harks back to the evolution of
the rule which now enables an assignee to collect the chose.'" That
analysis deems the assignee vested with a power of attorney to repre-
sent the aspignor and collect the chose. In case the power of attorney
has not been paid for, it is argued that it is revocable, and consequently
an assignment gratuitously made does not put the chose beyond the
reach of the would-be donov. Clearly such an analysis is out of place
if the donee be the obligor. He has no need for a power of attorney
' "A contract was conceived of as a strictly personal obligation. It was as
impossible for the obligee to substitute another in his place as it would have been
for him to change any other term of the obligation. This conception, rather
than the doctrine of maintenance, is the source of the rule that a chose in action
is not assignable." Ames, Lectures on Legal History (1913) 258.
"'Jenks, Consideration and the Assignment of Choses in Action (igoo) r6
LAw QuAR. REv. 241; Anson, Assignment of Choses in Action (19O1) 17 id.
9o; Costigan, Gifts Inter Vivos of Choses in Action (1911) 27 id. 326; Rundell,
Gifts of Choses in Action (1918) 27 YALE LANW JouRNAL, 643.
" See note 16. See also Warder v. rack (i8gi) 82 Iowa, 434, 48 N. W. 729;
Pugh v. Miller (189o) 126 Ind. 189, 25 N. E. io4o; Jones v. Moore (1898) 102
Ky. 591, 44 S. W. 126; Briscoe v. Eckley (1876) 35 Mich. 112; Coe v. Hinkley
(1896) lO9 Mich. 6o8, 67 N. W. 915; Buxton v. Barrett (1882) 14 R. I. 40;
Herbert v. Simson (1915) 22o Mass. 480, io8 N. E. 65; Fortesque v. Barnett
(1854, Ch.) 3 Mylne & K. 36; Ames, Cases on Trists (2d ed. 1893) 145, 155, 162.
See note 15.
"i Williston, Contracts (1920) sec. 408 ff.
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to represent the creditor. The parties to the discharge have no thought
of giving him one. The creditor has endeavored simply to surrender
his right and close the matter. Thus the chief objection to the gift of
choses has no application to the question of a gratuitous discharge of
the debtor by his creditor. When due regard has been taken of the
interest of the debtor, there is no quality in a chose in action which
should make it incapable of being transferred, by gift or otherwise,
just as rights in rem are transferred. Professor Hohfeld has pointed
out clearly that a right in personam, intrinsically considered, may be,
point for point, the same as a right in rem, differing from the latter
only externally and in the fact that it has few or no "fundamentally
similar, though distinct, rights as its companions."20
The giving of choses in action has frequently been impeded by formial
requirements. Since a chose cannot be delivered in the way tangible
chattels can and must be delivered in order to effectuate a gift, courts
have often taken as determining factors, as to the validity of the gift,
the character of the evidence of the chose and the fact of delivery of
that evidence to the donee. 12 Such requirements as these should, so
far as they are based on reason or authority, be applied to the gratuitous
discharge. No argument is intended to be made herein that such
transactions should be spared from the usual rules of evidence, but
only that they should be spared from the consideration requirement.
If part payment by the debtor is not consideration, the discharge to
be effective should comply with the formalities required in making a
gift of a chose in action. In many cases where the rule requiring con-
sideration for a discharge is enunciated as the reason for holding the
discharge invalid, the same result might be reached on the ground that
the character of the evidence of the chose and the manner in which its
transfer was attempted were not suitable for accomplishing a gift.
If this type of case were to be eliminated from the support of the
oft-repeated rule that a discharge attempted on part payment by the
debtor is invalid for want of consideration, that rule would be left much
less firmly entrenched than it is generally supposed to be.
The possibility of gift of his claim by the obligee to the obligor
need not be argued from principle alone. In addition to the numerous
cases holding that the obligee may give his claim to anyone, 22 the courts
have frequently held that a debt may be the subject of a gift by the
creditor to his debtor.2" They have generally held in cases where a
'Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions (1917) 26 YALE LAw JouRNAL,
710, 723.
2 I Williston,.op. cit., sec. 44o.
See note 16.
"Lanham v. Meadows (1913) 72 W. Va. 61o, 78 S. E. 75o (promissory note
delivered by holder to maker) ; Hathaway v. Lynn (1889) 75 Wis. 186, 43 N. W.
956 (oral gratuitous release from contract to run bus from passenger trains to
hotel); McKenzie v. Harrison (189o) i2O N. Y. 26o, 24 N. E. 458 (gratuitous
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claim consists of a part admittedly due and a balance in dispute that
payment by the debtor of the undisputed amount will support a release
of the entire claim.2 4 Obviously, the debtor in these cases has done
nothing more than he was bound to do, and the release stands unsup-
ported by any consideration. These cases, also, might therefore be
cited as authority for the proposition that claims may be surrendered
without consideration.25 Thus the rule quoted at the outset of this
article not only seems wrong on principle but also contrary to the
result reached in other situations where the problem, when analysed,
is identical with that presented in the attempt of a creditor to discharge
his debtor on part payment of the debt.
The gift of a claim by an obligee to his obligor has sometimes been
taken to be a different sort of transaction from a discharge on payment
of a smaller amount than is due.26 As already indicated, the two pro-
positions following are frequently laid down in the cases; first, a
release or discharge executed by a creditor in exchange for part pay-
ment of a due and undisputed claim is inoperative; second, the gift
of a debt by the creditor to his debtor, generally called a forgiveness,
does extinguish the debt. Conceding that payment of a smaller amount
than is due does not amount to consideration, what essential difference
is there between the two attempted transactions? Looking particularly
at the first situation, why should the attempt of the parties fail? Of
course, the part payment by the obligor will not of itself discharge the
debt. Nothing the obligor can do, short of complete performance,
will exonerate him. But on -principle it seems inconceivable that the
creditor's act should not be given effect. If the creditor may be judged
by his acts, he has endeavored, by the consent, to cancel, surrender,
remission of balance due under a lease, effected by giving a receipt in full. The
court refers to the doctrine of Foakes v. Beer, but asserts that "this rule has no
application when the payment is made under an agreement which is recognized
as valid by the parties, and has been fully executed") ; Green v. Langdon (1873)
28 Mich. 221 (gratuitous indorsements upon a mortgage held an extinguishment
of the mortgage debt to the extent of the indorsement); Holmes v. Holmes
(1902) 129 Mich. 412, 89 N. W. 47 (written receipt for money due as interest
under a mortgage, only a part of that money being actually paid, deemed a
gift of the interest above the amount received).
Contra, Metcalfe v. Kent (i898) 1O4 Iowa, 487, 73 N. W. 1037; Whitehill v.
Wilson (1832, Pa.) 3 Pen. & Watt, 405.
2Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. v. Clark (1900) 178 U. S. 353, 20 Sup. Ct. 924;
Neely v. Thompson (19o4) 68 Kan. 193, 75 Pac. ii7; Tanner v. Merrill (i895)
lo8 Mich. 58, 65 N. W. 664; Treat v. Price (1896) 47 Neb. 875, 66 N. W. 834.
It has long been the rule in England that the holder of a negotiable instrument
might without receiving consideration renounce his right against any party
liable on the instrument. Foster v. Dawber (185) 6 Exch. 839. That rule
was incorporated in the Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, and in the Negotiable
Instruments Law. Brannan, Negotiable Instruments Law (3d ed. i919) sec.
122.
" Gray v. Barton, supra note 8; McKenzie v. Harrison, supra note 23.
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forgive, or release the debt. Whether his language is that he"surren-
ders," "forgives," "releases," "discharges," or "receives in full," the
essence of his endeavor is to divest himself of the right, and to leave
nothing executory on either side.
The part payment may be the motive that induces the creditor to
release, but, even so, it is of no importance whether this motive would
fulfil the requirements for consideration. Assuming the absence of
fraud and mistake of fact, the creditor knows just what he is receiving,
and the only conceivable mistake on his part is a mistake as to the
legal significance of the part payment, which mistake would, of course,
be immaterial.
While the courts recognize these two classes of cases, deciding one
class according to the first and one according to the second proposition
above, the cases themselves give no very satisfactory criteria for the
separation. In cases decided according to the first proposition the
acknowledgment of receipt may be as formal as in those decided by the
second 27 and the intention of release and cancel may be as cleai- s.2
In cases to which the second proposition is applied, the word "gift"
may or may not appear ;29 the obligor need not be a near relative ;0
and there may or may not be part payment by the debtor.3 ' Justice
Glover in one of the gift cases3 2 makes the following attempt to distin-
guish the part payment cases:
"The counsel of the respondent cites numerous cases where it has
been held that a payment of a less sum upon a debt actually due cannot
satisfy or discharge the entire debt, but only so much as is paid, although
agreed to be received in satisfaction of the whole. The cases to this
effect are uniform, from Fitch v. Sutton, 5 East 230, to Ryan v. Ward,
48 N. Y. 204; Bunge v. Koop, id. 225. The reasons upon which these
cases were determined were, that it was not good as an accord and
satisfaction, as it was obvious that a smaller sum could not satisfy a
greater; that, when the debt was due, payment of a part by the debtor
was no consideration for a promise of the creditor to discharge the
residue, as the creditor received nothing to which he was not entitled,
and there being no consideration for any such agreement, it was a nude
pact and void."
Justice Haight in another gift case2 2 makes the following observation:
"Under the view taken by us of this case, it does not become necessary
to approve or disapprove of the doctrine [of Foakes v. Beer] ;- for this
rule has no application when the payment is made under an agreement
which is recognized as valid by the parties and has been fully executed."
SSchlessinger v. Schlessinger (197o) 39 Colo. 44, 88 Pac. 970: "The rule is
settled . . . regardless of the form of receipt which may be given."
Schlessinger v. Schlessinger, supra.
'Holmes v. Holmes, supra note 23.
"Gray v. Barton, supra note 8.
"Holmes v. Hohnes, supra note 23; McKenzie v. Harrison, supa note 23.
Gray v. Barton, supra note 8.
'McKenzie v. Harrison, supra note 23.
THE RULE IN FOAKES V.. BEER
If the promise or agreement to release is executory, purporting
merely to obligate the promisor to effect a release in the future, it
clearly is not binding in the absence of consideration. It would seem
equally clear' that such an executory promise or agreement would be
inoperative even if called a gift. On the other hand, if the creditor
indicates an intention on his part that the discharge be executed, it
should be effective whether we call the transaction a "gift" or something
else. At any rate, there seems to be no foundation for the distinction
taken in the extracts quoted, as there is no more reason for arbitrarily
construing a discharge by way of settlement executory than for so
construing a discharge called a "gift."
Professor Ames has clearly indicated the origin of the rule that a
valid discharge cannot be given when the debtor pays only part of the
amount due on a liquidated and undisputed claim. 34 If, however, this
unpopular rule had depended on judical precedent alone for its strength,
it could not have endured and spread to practically all English law
jurisdictions. The rule lived because the discharge was mistaken for a
contract. In order to maintain a supposed consistency, consideration
was held essential to the discharge. "The rule has always been
regarded as more logical than just."35  While it is perhaps too late
to change, by the course of decision, a result so authoritatively estab-
lished, it is as least fair to the common law to note that the rule is not
required by any of the fundamental doctrines of that common law.
The consideration requirement has been dragged outside the sphere of
its legitimate operation. Its use to hamper the cancellation of claims is
neither "logical" nor "just."
'Ames, op. ci., 12 HRv. L. Rzv. 515, Lectures on Legal History, 329.
"Per Justice Mitchell in Ebert v. Johns (1903) 2o6 Pa. 395, 398, 55 Atl. io64.
